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Control mechanisms for optimisation in large distributed systems cannot be constructed based
on traditional methods of control because they are typically characterised by distributed infor-
mation and costly and/or noisy communication. Furthermore, noisy observations and dynamism
are also inherent to these systems, so their control mechanisms need to be ﬂexible, agile and ro-
bust in the face of these characteristics. In such settings, a good control mechanism should
satisfy the following four design requirements: (i) it should produce high quality solutions,
(ii) it should be robustness and ﬂexibility in the face of additions, removals and failures of com-
ponents, (iii) it should operate by making limited use of communication, and (iv) its operation
should be computational feasible. Against this background, in order to satisfy these require-
ments, in this thesis we adopt a design approach based on dividing control over the system
across a team of self–interested agents. Such multi–agent systems (MAS) are naturally dis-
tributed (matching the application domains in question), and by pursing their own private goals,
the agents can collectively implement robust, ﬂexible and scalable control mechanisms. In more
detail, the design approach we adopt is (i) to use games with pure strategy Nash equilibria as a
framework or template for constructing the agents’ utility functions, such that good solutions to
the optimisation problem arise at the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game, and (ii) to derive
distributed techniques for solving the games for their Nash equilibria.
The speciﬁc problems we tackle can be grouped into four main topics. First, we investigate a
class of local algorithms for distributed constraint optimisation problems (DCOPs). We intro-
duce a unifying analytical framework for studying such algorithms, and develop a parameteri-
sation of the algorithm design space, which represents a mapping from the algorithms’ compo-
nents to their performance according to each of our design requirements. Second, we develop a
game–theoretic control mechanism for distributed dynamic task allocation and scheduling prob-
lems. The model in question is an expansion of DCOPs to encompass dynamic problems, and
the control mechanism we derive builds on the insights from our ﬁrst topic to address our four
design requirements. Third, we elaborate a general class of problems including DCOPs withii
noisy rewards and state observations, which are realistic traits of great concern in real–world
problems, and derive control mechanisms for these environments. These control mechanism
allow the agents to either learn their reward functions or decide when to make observations of
the world’s state and/or communicate their beliefs over the state of the world, in such a manner
that they perform well according to our design requirements. Fourth, we derive an optimal al-
gorithm for computing and optimising over pure strategy Nash equilibria in games with sparse
interaction structure. By exploiting the structure present in many multi-agent interactions, this
distributed algorithm can efﬁciently compute equilibria that optimise various criteria, thus re-
ducing the computational burden on any one agent and operating using less communication than
an equivalent centralised algorithms
For each of these topics, the control mechanisms that we derive are developed such that they
perform well according to all four of our design requirements. In sum, by making the above
contributions to these speciﬁc topics, we demonstrate that the general approach of using games
with pure strategy Nash equilibria as a template for designing MAS produces good control
mechanisms for large distributed systems.To Jenny
xiiiChapter 1 Introduction 6
Distributed constraint
optimisation problems
(Chapters 3 and 4)
Dynamic constraints
Distributed dynamic
task allocation and
scheduling (Chapter 5)
Noisy rewards
and state
observations
Learning equilibria in
noisy potential games;
Partially–observable
coordination problems
(Chapter 6 and 7)
Generalising constraints
to local games
Efﬁciently computing
equilibria in games
with sparse interaction
structure (Chapter 8)
FIGURE 1.1: Connections between topics covered in this thesis.
mechanism design problem involves balancing these four requirements against one another, the
requirements cannot be addressed separately, and must be treated as a whole for each new prob-
lem. Consequently, we group our contributions by the speciﬁc topics they address. In particular,
in this thesis the contributions to the state of the art can be grouped under the following headings:
• Algorithms for distributed constraint optimisation problems,
• Control mechanisms for distributed dynamic task allocation and scheduling,
• Approaches to dealing with noisy rewards and state observations, and
• An algorithm for efﬁciently computing pure strategy Nash equilibria in games with sparse
interaction structure.
As expected, these topics are closely related. In particular, our work covering the ﬁrst topic cov-
ers the major components of the topics addressed in the subsequent chapters (as illustrated in
Figure 1.1). Speciﬁcally, each of the remaining topics involves an extension of the basic model
of distributed constraint optimisation. First, our model of distributed dynamic task allocation
and scheduling is essentially an expansion of distributed constraint optimisation to encompass
dynamic problems. Second, noisy rewards and state observations elaborate the distributed con-
straint optimisation model with realistic traits of great concern in real–world problems. Third,
games with sparse interaction structure are a direct generalisation of the distributed constraint
optimisation model to interactions in which the agents’ utilities for local interactions are not
identical (as they are in distributed constraint optimisation problems), and rather are modelled
by local games. We now describe these topics in more detail, and for each, we state how the
work contained in this thesis addresses aspects of the design requirements listed above.Chapter 2 Literature Review 61
In this chapter, we reviewed the necessary background material to our work. We began by re-
viewing noncooperative games, which are used as aframework for analysing MAS.Weprovided
deﬁnitions of three solution concepts — Nash, correlated and strong equilibrium — and showed
how the basic noncooperative model can be extended to consider repeated and multi–state inter-
actions (Section 2.4), and uncertainty in agent types and states of the world (Section 2.3).
Wethen considered the speciﬁc class ofpotential games(Section 2.5). Inrelation tothedesign of
MAS, these games posses two desirable characteristics. Firstly, potential games are guaranteed
to posses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Secondly, many adaptive algorithms are known to
converge in repeated play of potential games. Taken together, these two traits make potential
game a very useful class of games for the designer of a MAS. Following this, in Section 2.6 we
reviewed several distributed learning heuristics algorithms which converge in repeated self–play
in potential games.
We then moved on to a more traditional computer science topic, and described two compact
graphical representations of games with sparse interaction structure (Section 2.7), graphical and
hypergraphical normal form games, and reviewed three algorithms that exploit such graphical
structure to efﬁciently compute Nash equilibria. We then introduced the distributed constraint
optimisation (DCOP) model, and discussed its reformulation as a game. Finally, we reviewed
several complete and approximate distributed algorithms for DCOPs.
In analysing this literature, we have identiﬁed the framework of noncooperative games with pure
strategy Nash equilibria as providing a set of templates for many salient MAS design problems.
In particular, such games are naturally speciﬁed in terms of independent autonomous agents, and
can be used to characterise solutions in terms of stable states of the MAS. Additionally, results
that already exist in the literature can be often be applied to MAS design problems. For these
reasons, noncooperative games will be adopted as the analytical framework for this research.
Given this background, in the coming chapters we will show that control mechanisms satisfying
the four design requirements above can be constructed by designing the utilities of these agents
so that they play games with pure strategy Nash equilibria.Chapter 3 A Parameterisation of DCOP Algorithms Via Potential Games 67
However, some algorithms are identiﬁed by their use of speciﬁc adjustment schedules
that allow for preferential adjustment or parallel execution. Furthermore, in some cases
the adjustment schedule is embedded in the decision stage of the algorithm.
Note that communication does not ﬁgure explicitly in this framework. Information is communi-
cated between agents for two purposes: (i) to calculate the value of their target function, or (ii)
to run the adjustment schedule. Given this, the communication requirements of each algorithm
depend on the needs of these two stages. For example, algorithms that use random adjustment
protocols only transfer information between agents to calculate the value of their target function
(usually just their neighbours’ strategies), whereas in algorithms that use preferential adjustment
schedules (such as maximum–gain messaging), additional information may be required to run
the adjustment schedule.
Given this background, this section examines the forms that each of the three algorithm stages
can take. Indoing so, wemake clear, forthe ﬁrst time, the manyconnections between the various
algorithms. During this section we will be referring to many algorithms from the literature on
DCOP algorithms and learning in games. The most important were described in Sections 2.6
and 2.9.2, and are:
• Best response, smooth best response, and better–reply dynamics (Section 2.6.1);
• The distributed stochastic algorithm (Section 2.9.2.1);
• Distributed simulated annealing (Section 2.9.2.2);
• Maximum–gain messaging algorithm (Section 2.9.2.3);
• Adaptive play and spatial adaptive play (Section 2.6.3);
• Fictitious play, smooth ﬁctitious play and joint strategy ﬁctitious play (Section 2.6.2);
• Regret matching and variants of regret monitoring (Section 2.6.4);
• Stochastic coordination–2 algorithm and maximum–gain messaging–2 algorithm (Sec-
tion 2.9.2.4) ;
For reference, pseudo code sketches of these algorithms are provided in Appendix A.
At this point we reiterate that four signiﬁcant DCOP algorithms described in Section 2.9.1 —
Max–Sum, OptAPO, ADOPT and DPOP — are not included in this parameterisation. Nonethe-
less, we do refer to techniques used by these algorithms that may be applied to local iterative
approximate best response algorithms.
Wenow discuss the various target functions that are used in DCOPalgorithms, and then examine
different decision rules and adjustment schedules used in DCOP algorithms in turn.Chapter 4 Using the DCOP Parameterisation to Develop New Algorithms and Predict
Performance 96
40 Node Graphs
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Immediate Reward / Gain Target Function
S
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
Time
 
 
MGM
DSA−B(0.4)
SAP
gSAP
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Fictitious Play Target Functions
S
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
Time
 
 
FP
smFP
JSFP−I
S−JSFP
80 Node Graphs
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Immediate Reward / Gain Target Function
S
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
Time
 
 
MGM
DSA−B(0.4)
SAP
gSAP
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Fictitious Play Target Functions
S
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
Time
 
 
FP
smFP
JSFP−I
S−JSFP
FIGURE 4.1: Average utility vs. time for local iterative approximate best response DCOP
algorithms.Chapter 5 Distributed Dynamic Task Allocation and Scheduling 104
each approximating game (we could equally well use alternative methods, such as distributed
simulated annealing or ﬁctitious play, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4 for the DCOP setting).
Beyond this, we extend the analysis of our approach to situations where the communication and
observation range of the agents is restricted. In these settings, the agents cannot see the entire
state of the world or do not know the strategies of all other agents, and therefore must make
their decision on the basis of incomplete information. This type of limitation is common in
many real–world scenarios, and particularly those that possess a spatial dimension. For exam-
ple, in a disaster response setting, the central message distribution point may be out of action, or
damage to physical infrastructure may remove the ability to use wide–area broadcast commu-
nication. In these situations, the agents’ utility functions can still be derived in such a way so
that they are aligned with the global objectives of the system. In addition, we empirically evalu-
ate our technique on the ambulance–to–civilian allocation problem in RoboCup Rescue (RCR),
which is an example of a task allocation problem with hard deadlines and varying processing re-
quirements. By doing so, we show that our technique performs comparably to a centralised task
scheduler when communication is not limited, and that it outperforms the centralised approach
as the agents’ communication and observation ranges are restricted. Interestingly, we also ﬁnd
that our approach sometimes performs better with moderate restrictions on its communication
and observation range than it does when it has complete information, and we conjecture that
this is due to a reduction in the space of possible solutions, resulting in quicker convergence to
a Nash equilibrium solution.
Given this context, the work presented in this chapter extends the state of the art in the following
ways:
1. We introduce a new technique for approximating Markov games using a series of over-
lapping potential games.
2. We develop a novel distributed solution technique for the approximating games, based on
the distributed stochastic algorithm.
3. We show that our technique is robust to restrictions on the range over which agents can
communicate and observe, restrictions which typically cause centralised approaches to
fail.
The ﬁrst contribution is aimed at satisfying design Requirements 1 (high quality solutions) and
4 (computational feasibility), while, at the same time, the second contribution allows us to sat-
isfy Requirements 2 (robustness and ﬂexibility) and 3 (limited communication requirements).
The third contribution, then, demonstrates that the control mechanism we derive successfully
satisﬁes these four design requirements.Chapter 5 Distributed Dynamic Task Allocation and Scheduling 115
Foligno
Kobe
Virtual City
FIGURE 5.3: Examples of a maps used in our RoboCup Rescue experiments. Green dots are
casualties (varying from light green for healthy agents to black), white dots are ambulances,
red are ﬁre brigade and blue are police agents.Chapter 5 Distributed Dynamic Task Allocation and Scheduling 118
FIGURE 5.4: Comparingthe task allocationmethods across the Foligno, Kobe and Virtual City
maps.
of the variation in scores between maps is due to the rate at which new trapped civilians are
introduced. In particular, civilians are discovered at a quicker rate in the Kobe map than in
Foligno or Virtual City. This is illustrated clearly in Figure 5.5. Here, a slower rate of discovery
allows OPGA to ﬁnd good quality solutions more regularly than in maps where, at times, the
rate of civilians’ discovery is faster. Thus, OPGA performs better in Foligno and Virtual City
than in Kobe. Furthermore, this matches with the assumption we make that the state of the world
moves slowly enough for us to ignore the effect of the possible changes to the state of the world
(in particular, the list of civilians), without inducing signiﬁcant errors. When this assumption is
less warranted, as in the Kobe scenario, the algorithm performs relatively worse.
Now we turn to the second batch of experiments (see Figure 5.6). From this, we observe that the
performance of the centralised greedy algorithm degrades at a quicker rate than OPGA, both in
terms of its mean performance and the variability in its performance (as seen in larger error bars
at each restriction level). In contrast OPGA performs better than the centralised approach when-
ever the agents’ communication range is restricted (with the exception of Kobe when restricted
to 5%, which is probably due to stochastic variation, and not statistically signiﬁcant). However,
when the range is severely restricted (such as when the range is restricted to 5% of the map), the
information ﬂowing to the agents is minimal, hence the performance of any method will tend
to be poor. This is precisely the effect of restricting the communication and observation range
we expected to see, and justiﬁes our arguments for using a principled decentralised algorithm in
restricted range environments.Chapter 5 Distributed Dynamic Task Allocation and Scheduling 119
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FIGURE 5.5: Example time series of the methods on the Foligno, Kobe and Virtual City maps.Chapter 5 Distributed Dynamic Task Allocation and Scheduling 120
FIGURE 5.6: Comparingthemethodsasthecommunicationandobservationrangeisrestricted.Chapter 5 Distributed Dynamic Task Allocation and Scheduling 122
This control mechanism was derived to satisfy our four design requirements, and our results
demonstrate that this has been achieved. As such, the work presented in this chapter represents
another step towards completing our principle research aim of deriving control mechanisms for
large distributed systems.Chapter 6 Convergent Learning in Potential Games with Perturbed Unknown Rewards 125
Against this background, in this chapter we tackle the problem of learning equilibria in repeated
potential games with noisy unknown rewards. Such situations include DCOPs with initially
unknown rewards whose values are only revealed through noisy observations.
An example of a setting where this may occur is in an ad hoc wireless sensor networks for a
wide–area surveillance problem, such as the one described in Farinelli, Rogers and Jennings
(2008). In this paper, the authors consider the problem of maximising the efﬁciency of a sensor
network deployed for wide–area surveillance by coordinating of the sense/sleep schedules of
power constrained energy-harvesting sensor nodes. They speciﬁcally consider a deployment of
sensors distributed in an urban setting that can sense nearby trafﬁc (they consider both acoustic
and vibration sensors that can be used to detect foot or vehicle trafﬁc). These events occur
at random, but their mean frequency varies with the time of day, and at the outset, this mean
frequency of events is unknown to the sensors. In order to cover the entire ﬁeld of observation,
the sensors’ observation ranges overlap, and they know this, however, they do not know to what
degree they overlap. Now, each sensor’s battery charge is generated by harvesting energy from
the environment. Consequently, they can only be actively sensing for a limited time each day
(in these sensors, the signal processing required to reliably detect events represents the greatest
drain on the sensors’ batteries). For example, if this period is one quarter of the day, then the
agent has to make a decision on which of the four quarters it chooses to actively sense, and
which it should sleep for. Together, the sensors want to observe as many events as possible, so
they want to be on at the times the event frequency is at its highest, which is initially unknown.
On the other hand, the sensors do not want to be on at the same time as other sensors with whom
their sensing ranges overlap, since redundant sensing wastes resources. Hence, the problem is
to coordinate sense/sleep cycles of the sensors so to maximise the expected number of events
observed each day, while at the same time coordinating the search of the joint action space to
learn the mean frequencies of events occurring in each sector under observation.
In more detail, potential games with perturbed unknown rewards are games in which an agent’s
payoff for each outcome is drawn from a distribution with bounded variance whose mean is
consistent with a potential function (in the sense of the standard deﬁnition of potential games
given in Section 2.5). In this chapter we derive new ﬁctitious play and adaptive play processes
for potential games with perturbed unknown rewards and prove that they converge to Nash equi-
libria. These algorithms are variants of the two classes of the local approximate best response
algorithms investigated in Chapters 3 and 4. Like the algorithms addressed in those chapters, the
variants of ﬁctitious play and adaptive play derived here operate in such a way so as to satisfy
our four design requirements from Section 1.1: (i) high quality solutions, (ii) robustness and
ﬂexibility in the face of changes to the set of components, (iii) limited used of communication,
and (iv) generating solutions in a timely manner or by using a reasonable amount of computa-
tional resource. In order to address such problems, the adaptive processes we derive interleave
the recursive estimation of reward function means with adaptation to the strategies of others in
the game. Our approach to these types of problems give agents the ability to effectively learn
their reward functions while coordinating on a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In so doing, weChapter 8 An Algorithm for Optimising Over Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria 178
the optimality of a solution is a key requirement, but where a distributed algorithm is nonethe-
less required. Furthermore, VNP can be applied to games outside the class of potential games,
because its convergence is only dependent on topology, rather than the structure of agents’ utility
functions. As such, the problems addressed in this chapter represent a signiﬁcant generalisation
of the DCOP model addressed earlier, and the VNP algorithm itself represents the opposing ex-
treme of distributed algorithms from the local approximate best response algorithms (and their
adaptations for other extension to the DCOP model) examined in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6l, in that
it is an optimal message–passing algorithm.